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OUR FREEDOMS AND PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL ENACTMENTS 
Regina v. Reed, County Court of Westminster, Chilliwack Registry 
#385/82, January 1984. 
In our free and democratic society there has always been a strong 
support for our fundamental freedoms History has recorded persecu-
tions of those who did not subscribe to the same theological theories 
of the state church or the supression of those who dared to speak out 
against tyrannic or oppressive governments. It taught us never to 
erode the freedoms of religion, speech, association and the like. 
Thomas Jefferson, in the beginning of the last century, warned that 
when these freedoms are exercised adversely to our personal interests 
they are inclined to become unpopular with the majority. Particularly 
when "freedoms" are exploited by the criminal element or by those 
perceived to belong to the lunatic fringe, society is inclined to 
allow or even demand exceptions to or limitations of these freedoms. 
President Jefferson concluded that if they can be restricted or 
removed to silence those who annoy us, they can equally be limited for 
social, political, economic or religious purposes. He warned that 
relinquishing any of these freedoms for things like national security 
or administrative convenience would, considering human nature and the 
omnipresence of those addicted to power, cause us to lose them all. 
(Truer words were never spoken). 
However, our right to tranquility and privacy must also be consi-
dered. Distinct from the exercise of a "right", the exercise of a 
"freedom" by one individual does not place an obligation on another 
(he or she is free to speak but I am not obligated to listen). 
Exercise of freedoms is inclined to create conflict and excessive 
exercise may well render someone liable. Slander is a prime example 
of this. 
The common law has always attempted to balance these conflicting 
interests and prevented erosion of our freedoms, which are suDDD.arized 
and reiterated in a statute known as the Bill of Rights. It was 
claimed by many that the common law and an ordinary statute like the 
Bill of Rights were inadequate to ensure us that these rights were 
more than a stroke of the pen in the Parliament of Canada. 
The Bill of Rights which can be repealed or amended by a simple 
majority in the Canadian Parliament does not apply to the provinces or 
- 2 
municipalities. It was considered akin to a pledge by John to love 
Mary by the former putting it on his arm with ink. It simply would 
wash off when John would start to feel differently. On the 17th of 
April of 1982, by including a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our 
patriated constitution, we tattooed the assurance of these freedoms on 
Canada's chest. This entrenchment of these rights and freedoms 
includes a complicated means to amend or repeal them, which would be 
equivalent to cosmetic surgery in our analogy. 
Our tattoo is one we must not cover up or only display when we are in 
company that appreciates such decoration. It is something we must 
have consistently on display regardless of the mood of the season. 
Being bare chested like that at all times may bring considerable 
discomfort and at other times, relief. However, that is the price we 
pay for consistency. Human propensities considered, not being able to 
shut up those who annoy us or to rid ourselves of nuisances is a 
discomfort. 
Necessary restrictions of the freedoms we are constitutionally assured 
of, must be consistently applied to all Canadians, and only the 
Federal government can legislate those restrictions. Consequently, 
the regulatory type laws the provinces and municipalities create, are 
not operable when used in situations where it deprives a person of 
guaranteed freedoms. 
For instance, a municipality may regulate the use of sound systems. 
Despite the nuisance in each situation being the same, there is a 
distinction between using it to profess one's political or religious 
beliefs or using it for commercial purposes. 
In this case, Mr. Reed, the accused, was a dissident Jehovah Witness 
who had been expelled from the Assembly. He sincerely believed he 
should make an effort to get his message across to his fellow 
believers. For this purpose he used a bull horn and addressed the 
congregation members when they approached the church building to 
attend services. 
The municipality in which he did this (the District of Chilliwack) has 
a by-law which obliges a person who wants to use a public address 
system in the outdoors, to obtain permission from council. 
Mr. Reed who found himself charged under the by-law conceded to all of 
the circumstances but argued that a by-law cannot stand in his way to 
"his right to freedom of religion and of expression" as guaranteed by 
the Charter of Rights. The trial Judge did not accept Reed's argu-
ments and convicted him. Mr. Reed appealed. 
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The County Court emphasized that the Charter made the freedoms of 
religion and expression a constitutional fact and supreme to all law. 
The by-law was an expression of a popular wish which could not inter-
fere with the accused's freedom to believe what he wished and to 
express those beliefs. 
Conviction set aside. 
* * * * * 
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AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE" - UNEXPLAINED DELAY 
Regina v. Wardlaw, County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry 
#CC831585, February 1984. 
At 11: 23 p.m. a constable stopped the accused and demanded breath 
samples from him. At 11:35 p.m. they arrived at the police station. 
The technician, a Corporal, arrived at 11: 45 p. m. All three met in 
the breathalyzer room where the Corporal prepared the instrument. When 
this was completed the Corporal ordered the constable to wait with the 
accused in another room. Approximately 30 minutes later the Corporal 
called the two back in and analyzed the accused's breath. 
The corporal did not testify and the constable could not explain why 
he and the accused had been ordered out of the room. 
The accused was convicted of over 80 mlg., and appealed. The County 
Court Judge held that the Crown must justify any delay in the taking 
of breath samples. Contrary to the trial judge's views, the County 
Court held that the unexplained delay caused a lack of showing that 
the samples were taken as soon as practicable. 
Accused acquitted. 
* * * * * 
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CONVICTION ON FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE ONLY 
Regina v. Gibbs, County Court of Cariboo, Quesnel Registry #44/82, 
April 1983. 
Gibbs, the accused, was fingerprinted in June of 1982 under the 
provisions of the Identification of Criminals Act. His prints were 
compared with those a robber left at the scene of the crime four years 
ago. The prints were found to be a perfect match. As a consequence a 
charge of robbery was pref erred. 
The robbery had taken place in the office of a motel. Two young men 
had come in and had filled out a registration card. When the propri-
eter saw that no licence number was given he informed the prospective 
guests that without that information he would not rent them a room. 
This led to the young men assaulting the proprietor and demanding all 
the money he had. A scuffle resulted and the robbers took off without 
getting anything. The fingerprint was found on the registration card. 
The accused did not call any witnesses and did not testify. The motel 
proprietor could not identify the accused. The question was whether 
there was evidence upon which the Court could convict the accused. 
The registration cards were out of reach of persons who are on the 
customer's side of the office counter. It was, therefore, a perfectly 
reasonable inference that the accused committed the offence of 
robbery. 
Accused convicted. 
Note: One may wonder how the facts add up to robbery. On the surface 
it seems an attempted robbery. However, the charge depended on the 
definition of robbery in s. 302(c) C.C. which states: 
"Everyone commits robbery who assaults any person with 
intent to steal from him". 
* * * * * 
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PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 
WINDFALL OR ANTICIPATED EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM AN AUTHORIZATION 
The Queen v. Commisso, Supreme Court of Canada, October 1983. 
The Court had granted an authorization to intercept the private 
communications of the accused and others in respect to the importing 
of heroin. A day before the authorization expired the police told 
Crown counsel that the interceptions had revealed that the persons 
mentioned in the authorization and an additional person, were now into 
counterfeit money and that they had a quantity of it in their posses-
sion. They asked that the authorization be amended to include that 
crime as well as the additional person. Crown counsel deemed this 
unnecessary and the authorization was simply renewed unamended. 
Charges arose from the counterfeit money and as predicted, the accused 
counted on the exclusionary rule in the Privacy Act which states that 
evidence obtained by the interception of a private communication is 
inadmissible unless the interception was lawfully made. The B. C. 
Court of Appeal* agreed with the accused and held that where evidence 
like in this case is anticipated, the Crown must inform the Court. If 
it fails to do so, the authorization in respect to offences other than 
the one for which it was issued, is void. Please note that the Court 
referred to incidents where the evidence is anticipated and not where 
it is "a windfall" situation. 
The Crown took the B. C. Court of Appeal ruling to the Supreme Court 
of Canada which by a 5:4 decision reversed the B. C. Court of Appeal 
precedent. 
Firstly the Supreme Court of Canada held that it was wrong to make a 
distinction between "anticipated" and "windfall" evidence. This means 
that if an authorization is obtained in regards to, for instance, 
the importing and trafficking of heroin, and the interceptions reveal 
a conspiracy to rob financial institutions, the authorization can be 
renewed in respect to the heroin (if indeed that investigation is 
continued) and all of the evidence obtained by the interception in 
respect to the robberies is perfectly admissible in evidence. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the protection of privacy . is there 
for precisely what its title indicates. The exclusionary tule is 
there to render valueless evidence that is obtained by violating the 
provision of the Act. However, if it has been shown to the Court 
* See page 6 of Volume 9 of this publication. Also 66 CCC (2d) 65 
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that a person is involved in criminal activities and an authorization 
issues, then the exclusionary rule has lost its purpose of discourag-
ing authorities from invading someone's privacy. 
An authorized interception of a private communication is lawful and 
the evidence thereby obtained therefore admissible in evidence. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Conviction restored. 
Note: It is predictable that despite this majority decision, we have 
ii'O't""heard the last of this issue. It was, for me at least, surprising 
that the Court held as it did. However, there are many other legal 
conflicts ongoing in respect to the meaning of a lawful interception 
and some of them are on the doorsteps of provincial Courts of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court of Canada. 
What I am implying is that informing the court at the time of 
renewal of newly discovered criminal activities seems reasonable, and 
will in the end be least harmful to law enforcement interest. Someday 
someone will draw a comparison between the Privacy Act provisions and 
those related to search warrants. In the section that states that 
during a lawful search we may seize anything not mentioned in the 
search warrant, of which we have reason to believe was obtained by the 
commission of an indictable offence, Parliament 1111st be referring to 
"windfall" evidence. If it is "anticipated" evidence the judiciary 
has told us many times that it should have been included in the appli-
cation for the warrant. Although there are, from a practical point of 
view, distinctions between the documents, a search warrant and an 
authorization are both judicial licences to invade someone's privacy. 
This relaxation of the search of private communications comes there-
fore unexpected and is surprising. 
* * * * * 
8 -
ADMISSIBILITY AND RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE OF PROPENSITY 
Morris and The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, October 1983. 
Morris was convicted of conspiracy to import and traffic heroin. The 
Crown had put in evidence a newspaper article found in the possession 
of the accused Morris entitled: "The heroin trade moves to Pakistan". 
The trial judge had admitted the newspaper clipping in evidence and 
the central issue in the accused's appeal was the admissibility of 
that clipping. Needless to say the Crown tended to imply that the 
accused had an inclination and was predisposed to deal in heroin. At 
least it showed his interest in heroin being available in Pakistan. 
The interesting question is when such evidence of propensity and 
inclinations of an accused are admissible. Needless to say that this 
question can arise in many circumstances. A person may have a list of 
addresses on him, of places which were all broken into; cheque forms 
may be found on a person suspected of fraudulent dealings with 
cheques; a book on how to cultivate marihuana along with other neces-
sary paraphernalia to grow the plant may be found in possession of a 
person who claims that he thought the seedlings he had in his green-
house were geraniums, etc. 
The question has never been whether such evidence is relevant, but if 
it is fair to admit it. Its probative value may be limited in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of an accused. It is not very likely 
that a judge, or any judge of the facts for that matter, will read too 
much in such evidence. 
In any event, the question in re.spect to the newspaper clipping was 
put to the Supreme Court of Canada and in a 4: 3 decision that Court 
spelled out the law on this issue. Firstly all the Justices are of 
the opinion that the newspaper article was relevant. Secondly, the 
Court referred to the possession as "unexplained possession". In 
other words, it is important what the accused had to say about the 
possession. Thirdly, there DllSt be a connection between the evidence 
that demonstrates a propensity and the offence alleged. In one case 
an accused was charged with importing marihuana and the Crown sought 
to have evidence admitted that showed the accused was a user*. The 
Supreme Court had held that there "is no connection or nexus between 
these two facts". 
* Cloutier v. The Queen [1979J 2 S.C.R. 709. 
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In this Morris case, however there was a connection between wanting 
to import heroin and an article that informs the accused where and by 
what means it is available. As a matter of fact, it ought to be of 
"vital interest" to such a person. 
In this case, the evidence showed that Hong Kong was the source of the 
heroin while the article referred to the drug trade in Pakistan. 
The Supreme Court said that that simply means that the evidence is of 
less weight than had the article referred to the Hong Kong trade. The 
evidence is relevant and admissible. The fact that the article 
referred to Pakistan while the accused's source was Hong Kong was 
simply a difference "in degree, not kind" 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal 
dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS REFERRING TO "POT" 
AS AN ABBREVIATION OF POTASSIUM. 
Regina v. Gardner, County Court of Prince Rupert, Smithers Registry 
#3600Z, August 1983. 
The accused appealed his conviction of "over 80 mlg." on the basis of 
the technician's certificate mentioning a substance which is not 
suitable for the purpose of analysis in the Borkenstein Breathalyzer:--
The certificate said the "an alex pot. bichromate breath test soln. 
lot ••• " was used. According to the Concise Chemical and Technical 
Dictionary• "pot." is an abbreviation for something entirely distinct 
from potassium. This "pot" is a substance not suitable for the 
breathalyzer. The the defence claimed that this was "evidence to the 
contrary" and the readings recorded in the certificate should not be 
accepted as the blood-alcohol content at the time of driving. 
However, the technician testified and told the Court that by using the 
abbreviation "pot." he referred to potassium. The trial judge felt 
that the testimony negated the defect and the accused was convicted. 
The County Court Judge held likewise and said that the technician's 
testimony confirmed that the solution used was suitable for the 
breathalyzer and the certificate evidence was of assistance to the 
Crown. 
* * * * * 
Accused's appeal 
dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
Note: There is at least one other case* where an argument arose over 
the same abbreviation. The lesson to be learned is not to abbreviate 
on certificates. 
* R. v. McDonald Vancouver Registry County Court CC820937 
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DOES TRANSPORTING AN UNSUSPECTING VICTIM TO A PLACE 
WHERE HE IS THEN UNLAWFULLY CONFINED, AMOUNT TO KIDNAPPING? 
Regina . v. Metcalf, B. c. Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA 000218, 
December 1983. 
Mr. Whyte, a friend of the accused, had attended secondary school with 
a Mr. Molner. Whyte phoned Molner to say that he would like to meet 
him at a certain place to reminisce. They met and Mr. Molner entered 
the car to sit next to Whyte who was driving. Whyte introduced Molner 
to the accused who was in the back seat. Whyte invited Molner to come 
with him to his place (Whyte' s) to have a beer. Molner accepted and 
they drove to a garage where Whyte claimed to live. The conversation 
was consistent with a reunion of old school mates and there was 
nothing to trigger suspicion on the part of Molner. After they did 
some drugs and drank some beer, the accused and Whyte threatened 
Molner with a knife and tied and gagged him. The rest of the facts 
are similar to what we see in movies in terms of messages, demands, 
rendez-vous and a garbage can in which to deposit the ransom. It all 
led to the apprehension of the accused and the liberation of Mr. 
Molner who was in need of medical attention due to consequences of 
physical abuse, pills he was forced to take, and lack of food during 
the ordeal. 
The accused Metcalfe was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for 
kidnapping. Appealing his conviction, the accused claimed that it was 
Whyte who transported Mr. Molner and that his involvement started at 
the garage. Therefore, he could at the most be convicted of unlaw-
fully confining Mr. Molner. He relied on the distinction between 
these two crimes. Kidnapping includes transporting the victim while 
unlawful confinement does not have such an ingredient. The accused 
claimed that Mr. Molner was transported not against his will, and in 
any event if there was any transporting involved which would convert 
the unlawful confinement into kidnapping, Whyte was the culprit and 
not he. In any event, Mr. Molner was not induced to come for the 
ride. However, should the Court find that the accused was a party to 
the transporting of Molner, he submitted that it was not linked to the 
unlawful confinement because there was no threat, violence, or induce-
ment used to make him come along. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal disagreed with the accused's interpretation 
of the law and adopted the definition given to kidnapping by the North 
Carolina State Supreme Court*: 
"Kidnap means the unlawful taking and carrying away of a 
person by force or fraud against his will". 
* State of North Carolina v. Gough (1962) 126 S.E. 2d. 118. 
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The Court held unanimously that an inducement was held out to the 
accused to take the ride. It was the "talking over of old times and 
having a beer". It was also found as a fact that the accused and 
Whyte had, from the outset, a common purpose. Therefore, the accused 
was a party to the transporting of Molner. The inducement was false 
and, therefore, amounted to fraud. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal was of the opinion that saying that forcible 
taking can only constitute kidnapping is too restrictive a view. 
"The fact that the person is not forcibly conveyed by a 
strategem of an inducement can make no difference. The 
crime is complete when the person is picked up and then 
transported by fraud to his place of confinement". 
* * * * * 
Accused's Appeal 
dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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WHEN MAY A COURT DRAW AN INFERENCE ADVERSE TO THE ACCUSED, 
FROM EVIDENCE THAT HE FAILED TO GIVE SAMPLES OF HIS BREATH? 
Regina v. Ranger, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver Registry CA 000224, 
December 1983 
The police officer who made the demand of the accused to give samples 
of his breath failed to testify that he had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the accused had been driving a motor vehicle 
within the last two hours while his ability to do so was impaired by 
alcohol. Neither was evidence adduced from which such belief could be 
inferred. This had caused an acquittal of a charge of "failing to 
blow". However, the accused was convicted of impaired driving. The 
Court had to rely on the provision in section 237(3) of the Criminal 
Code which simply states that where a person is tried for impaired 
driving an adverse inference may be drawn from evidence that he failed 
to comply with a demand for breath samples. The Court had held that 
despite the acquittal of "failing to blow", it could still draw 
adverse inferences from the evidence that was before the Court. 
After all, an acquittal may mean that there was no proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all the ingredients for "failing to blow" were 
met. This does not mean that there was no evidence of such failure. 
The accused disagreed with this view. Claiming that the acquittal 
precluded the Court from drawing any inferences adverse to him in 
regards to his "impaired drivng" charge, he appealed his conviction 
to the B. c. Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal fairly predictably held that there cannot be a 
hard and fast rule on the issue raised by the accused. Whether or not 
evidence of "failing to blow" may be considered for the purpose of 
section 237(3) following an acquittal on that charge, depends entirely 
on the reasons for the acquittal. The evidence eligible for the 
adverse inference must be "evidence that the accused, without reason-
able excuse failed or refused to comply with a demand made to him by a 
peace officer under section ••• 235(1)". 
In this case the Crown's position had to fail. The subsection refers 
to evidence of a failure to comply with a demand made under section 
235(1) c.c. In this case the accused was acquitted because there was 
no demand under section 235(1) C.C. due to no evidence of grounds 
prerequisite to it. Hence, section 237(3) c.c. could not be applied. 
However, the Court of Appeal did not hold that the subsection can only 
be applied if there is a conviction or evidence sufficient to support 
a conviction of "failing to blow". 
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The Court stated unanimously: 
"If the conclusion (the acquittal) is 
other than a finding that the elements 
under s. 235 ( 1) were not present, then 
the judge to rely on the inference 
237(3)". 
based on something 
of a lawful demand 
it will be open to 
authorized by s. 
Appeal allowed. 
New trial on impaired 
driving ordered. 
Comment: There is (in my view at least) some confusion on the issues 
argued in this case. Courts having deliberated similar patterns of 
facts and procedures, have held that where there is an acquittal for 
"failing to blow" the matter cannot be tried again in subsequent 
proceedings. After all there are doctrines in place (.!:!:!. judicata, 
issue estoppel, both related to double jeopardy) to prevent inconsis-
tent conclusions. I think the B. c. Court of Appeal in essence held 
that there is a considerable distinction between the accused being 
acquitted due to the burden of proof not having been met, and there 
being no evidence of "failure to blow". The Court of Appeal hinted 
that particularly where the acquittal of "failing to blow" is based on 
"purely technical grounds", the chances of section 237(3) c.c. apply-
ing increase. 
Although this was not used as an example but it seems fair to predict 
that where an accused who is found to have had a "reasonable excuse" 
for "failing to blow", and is consequently acquitted, evidence that he 
in fact did not give samples of his breath may not be eligible to be 
used for the purpose of the adverse inference provided in section 
237(3) c.c. The law states that if the accused's excuse is reasonable 
he can refuse to blow with impunity. It is not likely that the Courts 
will exclude the inference authorized in section 237(3) c.c. from that 
form of impunity. 
What should also be mentioned here is that the officer's failure to 
establish his grounds necessary for making a proper demand for samples 
of breath, is perhaps caused by a misconception regarding the rules of 
evidence. The accused had been involved in an accident. The officer 
attended the scene and received information about the accused and his 
condition. Although the reasons for judgment are not clear, it seems 
that the accused left the scene and went home. That is where the 
officer made the demand. The officer, perhaps believing that he could 
not relate to the Court what he had learned from others, had simply 
testified that he had gone to the accused's home and made his demand. 
If the witnesses at the scene were called, perhaps they did not testi-
fy that they had told the officer what they saw. 
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Consequently there was no evidence of the officer having the reason-
able and probable grounds to make the demand. 
Crown counsel should have asked the officer in direct examination what 
grounds he had to make the demand. Said the Court of Appeal on this 
point: 
"Evidence from the officer of what he learned from others 
before making the demand is admissible on the question of 
reasonable and probable grounds, and that is so whether or 
not the trial is only of a charge under s. 234 or 236 or 
also of a charge under s. 235(1)." 
* * * * * 
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INFORMATION OF AN INFORMANT BEING THE GROUNDS FOR A SEARCH WARRANT 
VALIDITY - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
BY THE EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT 
Regina v. Hartley and Graham, County Court of Yale, Kamloops No. 593 
c.c., October 1983. 
A police officer swore when applying for a search warrant that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a narcotic was kept in the 
dwelling of the accused Hartley. He attested that his grounds for so 
believing were based on confidential information. In his testimony 
at the accused's trial the officer told the Court how his informant 
had overheard a conversation (to which Hartley was a party) which 
indicated that a quantity of narcotics was stored at the Hartley 
home. The search paid off, the accused were charged and challenged 
the admissibility of the evidence found. 
The application for a search warrant did not contain any of the over-
heard conversation and only mentioned that there was "confidential 
information" that gave the officer grounds for his beliefs. However, 
the officer had gone to the home of the Justice of the Peace where he 
had told him in casual conversation, what the informant had passed on 
to him. The Narcotics Control Act stipulates that the Justice DD.1st be 
satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that a narcotic is in a home before he can grant a search 
warrant. Defence counsel claimed that although the officer told the 
Justice of his grounds, he did not give them under oath and they were 
therefore not part of the sworn application. Crown counsel disagreed 
and submitted that what the officer told the Justice was included in 
the application and was adequate to satisfy the Justice. 
Reviewing an abundance of cases on this point the County Court Judge 
concluded that the wording in section 10 N.C.A., being identical to 
its counterparts in the Criminal Code, means that the information 
which must satisfy the justice that the officer has the necessary 
reasonable and probable grounds, has to be information counnitted to 
writing in the sworn application for a search warrant. 
Evidence of the found narcotics was 
excluded 
Comment: Despite section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms it 
is doubtful that an invalid search warrant automatically results in 
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the evidence obtained from its execution being excluded. 
It seems that the Court first has to call on the accused to show on 
the balance of probabilities that his right to be secure from 
unreasonable search had been infringed because on account of the 
search warrant being technically invalid. Then, after having consi-
dered all circumstances, the Judge has to find that admitting the 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
Only then could he have rejected the good fruits that were harvested 
from the poisonous tree. 
It seems that the Judge in this case applied the strict exclusionary 
rule, which we, by virtue of section 24 of the Charter, do not have. 
* * * * * 
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IS ADMISSIBILITY OF A BREATH ANALYSIS CERTIFICATE 
DEPENDENT ON THE DEMAND FOR BREATH SAMPLES HAVING 
BEEN MADE ON THE REQUISITE REASONABLE AND PROBABLE 
GROUNDS? 
Regina v. Gibson, County Court of Westminster, New Westminster 
Registry X82-10226, November 1983. 
The accused was charged with "over 80 mlg.". The trial judge admitted 
the certificate of analysis in evidence but then held that, due to a 
lack of evidence to show that the demand for the breath samples was 
made on the well known requisite reasonable and probable grounds, the 
certificate could not serve as proof what the accused's blood-alcohol 
level was at the time of driving. The Crown appealed this decision. 
The County Court Judge held that the trial Judge had erred in law. 
The Supreme Court of Canada* made it clear that when a suspect accedes 
to a breath test within two hours from driving, the results of those 
tests are, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of the 
blood-alcohol level at the time of driving. Whether or not the 
officer had the required grounds to make a demand has no bearing on 
the proof the certificate is of the accused's blood-alcohol level. 
The grounds for a demand are essential in a prosecution for £ailing or 
refusing to give samples of breath, but not to substantiate the 
evidential value of the certificate. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal set aside. 
Case ref erred back to Provincial court for 
trial. 
* * * * * 
*Rilling v .. The Queen (1975), 31 C.R. (new series) 142. 
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ARE PROCEEDS OF BOOKMAKING OR BENEFITS FROM 
ILLEGAL BUSINESS A TAXABLE INCOME? 
Regina v. Christensen, British Columbia Supreme Court, Vancouver 
Registry CC830423, June 1983 
The accused was acquitted of income tax violations because the 
Provincial Court Judge ruled that benefits from illegal business 
(bookmaking in this case) was not an income as defined in the Income 
Tax Act. He had reasoned that if the Receiver General of Canada would 
tai' such income, he would in fact be guilty of possession of property 
obtained by an indictable offence. The trial judge held that other 
means could be applied to deter persons engaged in illegal business. 
The Crown appealed this decision. 
The Supreme Court Justice rejected the trial judge's reasons for 
acquitting the accused. She held: 
"The monies used to satisfy the tax debt may come from 
lawful means, even though they are calculated in unlawful 
activities, so there is no necessary contradiction between 
section 312 of the Criminal Code and the requirement of the 
Income Tax Act that tax be paid on income as there 
defined". 
The Justice concluded that the trial judge had erred in law on this 
issue and she ref erred the case back to him to continue the trial. 
* * * * * 
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ARBITRARY DETENTION 
NOT RELEASING AN IMPAIRED DRIVER WHEN THERE 
IS NO FURTHER NEED FOR CUSTODY 
Regina v. Mcintosh, County Court of Kooteney, Nelson Registry CC33-83 
Febuary 1984. 
The accused appealed his conviction of "over 80 mlg." He argued that 
an acquittal was an appropriate remedy for the infringement of his 
right not to be arbitrarily detained. At the conclusion of the 
officer's investigation, the accused asked if he could have his wife 
pick him up or take a taxi home. The officer refused to release the 
accused and detained him in cells from 22:30 till 9:10 the following 
day. 
Section 452 c.c. dictates that a peace officer shall not arrest if 
public interest is satisfied and in any event shall release a prisoner 
as soon as practicable when that interest has been satisfied. In this 
case it was conceded that the officer had no reason for continuing the 
custody of the accused. The only reason advanced by the constable was 
that the accused might have driven again. However, he admitted that 
by 3:00 hours the accused was in shape to drive. 
This left the Court to determine if the unjustified continuation of 
custody was an infringement of the accused's right not to be arbitrar-
ily detained or imprisoned (section 9 of the Charter). If so, can 
such an infringement entitle the arbitrarily imprisoned person to an 
acquittal as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter? 
The County Court Judge prefaced his consideration of this constitu-
tional issue by holding 
"In my view, the onus is upon the peace officer to satisfy 
himself on reasonable and probable grounds that for one or 
more of the reasons set forth in section 452, the person 
should be detained in custody". 
The officer's beliefs in this case were admittedly "mere 
speculation". The accused was described as "very co-operative" and 
not the slightest grounds were adduced in evidence to believe the 
accused would go back to his car and drive again. 
The Judge concluded that at least the detention of the accused beyond 
4: 00 hours, when he, according to all calculations would have been 
able to drive again legally, was without justification and thereby 
arbitrary 
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The appropriate remedy, the Court held, was acquittal. 
Appeal allowed. 
Conviction set aside and acquittal substi-
tuted. 
Comment: It is important to point out that what occurred here is 
distinct from the exclusionary rule. All the evidence was admitted 
and what caused the arbitrary detention was separate from the investi-
gation and the collecting of evidence. Many of the legal philosophers 
and the judiciary have problems with the exclusionary rule in that its 
consequences amount to exonerating one person for a wrong on account 
of the wrong committed by another. However, when the evidence a Court 
accepts was surreptitiously or unlawfully obtained, the impartial 
Court (which must be seen as an institution enforcing the rights of 
everyone) becomes, in the eyes of those who ought to have faith in 
that Court, a party to the means by which the evidence was obtained. 
Furthermore, evidence on the say-so of those who themselves have 
inf ringed the rights of others and committed offences to obtain that 
evidence, may encounter credibility problems which also reflects on 
the Courts. At least, that is part of the philosophy that supports 
the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
remedial measures for infringements of a person's rights and freedoms 
has been separated from the exclusionary rule. They were created by 
section 24, subsection (1) and (2) respectively. 
It seems predictable that acquittal in these circumstances is not the 
remedy the Superior Courts will prescribe. To remove criminal 
liability in compensation for an infringement of a person's rights 
seems, in the circumstances, out of order. The arbitrary confinement 
may have flowed from the offence the accused allegedly committed .and 
the investigatioJl into it, but it was not part of it. The remedy 
should perhaps have been a compensation that was equal to the fine 
levied or something innovative like that but not acquittal. There are 
several other arguments one could advance to show that the remedy this 
Court considered appropriate will not likely be so considered by other 
members of the judiciary. 
In any event, the events in this case should never have occurred as 
they did. 
* * * * * 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
DETAINED PERSON NOT ABLE TO INSTRUCT COUNSEL 
DUE TO BREAKDOWN OF TELEPHONE SYSTEM 
Regina v. Rosenon, County Court of Cariboo, Prince George Registry 
C 43/83, January 1984. 
The accused was arrested for impaired driving and a demand for breath 
samples was made of him. He was informed of his right to counsel and 
the accused asked to be provided with a telephone. This was done but 
no call was made due to a breakdown of the telephone system in the 
police station with the exception of the emergency phone in a secured 
area of the building. Without making any further requests the accused 
then gave samples of his breath. 
The Provincial Court Trial Judge held 
to an infringement of the accused ~s 
that by not allowing the certificate 
section 24( 1) · of the Charter). 
acquitted. The Crown appealed. 
that what had occurred amounted 
right to counsel. He remedied 
of analyses in evidence (under 
Consequently the accused was 
The County Court Judge found that the Provincial Court Judge had erred 
in law. He could only have excluded the certificate evidence under 
section 24( 2) of the Charter if it was shown by the accused on the 
balance of probabilities that his right had been infringed and that 
considering the circumstances, the admission of the certificate 
evidence would have brought the administration of justice into 
disrepute. However, the County Court Judge decided, despite this 
error on the part of the trial judge, to consider on the merits of 
this case if there had been an infringement of the accused's right to 
counsel. 
In view of the fact that the accused did not request to be taken to 
another telephone and due to the unavailabiliy of a phone, what trans-
pired was reasonable. The Judge pointed out the Supreme Court of 
Canada's* view that police had a duty to provide a telephone, if one 
is available (beware that the Brownridge case was decided prior to the 
Charter coming into effect). 
In any event the appeal judge found " nor do I think that the 
officer was legally bound to take the respondent outside in search of 
a telephone". He concluded: 
It seems to me far-fetched to suggest that the administra-
* Brownridge v. The queen (1972), 7 c.c.c. (2d) 417 
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tion of justice would be brought in disrepute by the 
admission of the results of a breath test, unless it can be 
shown that there was such a serious violation of the 
accused's right that the balance must be tipped in favour 
of the accused ••• ". 
Acquittal set aside. 
Certificate evidence admissible. 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR NOT GIVING SAMPLES OF BREATH 
Regina v. Ostaforoff, County Court of Yale, Kamloops Registry CCC 550, 
December 1983. 
The accused (claiming that he was "a man off the street") sat next to 
a telephone and a telephone book for 15 minutes without making any 
attempt to look up the number of a lawyer or dialing any number. He 
said he did not have a lawyer and did not want to blow until he spoke 
to one. As encouragement also failed to get some action, a "final" 
demand was made. However, again the accused refused unless he spoke 
to a lawyer first, but again made no effort of any kind to contact 
one. He was convicted accordingly and appealed. 
Defence claimed that lack of privacy had deprived the accused of his 
right to counsel and that this infringement of his right provided him 
with a reasonable excuse for the refusal. The answer to his defence 
were short and to the point: 
1. Police need not provide a telephone unless it is requested; 
2. There is no duty on police to leave the room or provide privacy 
in a~other way, unless the accused embarks on the exercise of his 
right to instruct counsel; and 
3. If the accused is not satisfied with the privacy afforded him or 
with the facilities provided him, he must request privacy and 
adequate facilities before he can claim his rights were 
infringed. 
Said the Court: "An accused must exercise his right to consult a 
lawyer affirmatively". 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY - UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
Regina v. Gordon, Vancouver County Court, Vancouver Registry C.C. 
831503, March 1984. 
Police gained surreptitious entry to a locked parking area of an 
apartment building. They then opened a locked car (previous visits 
were made to gain impressions of the lock) and searched it. A cache 
of what appeared to be cocaine was found in the trunk. The vehicle 
was placed under surveillance and the accused arrested when he opened 
the trunk and handled the substance which in the meantime was analyzed 
and found to to be cocaine. 
The accused was tried for possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
He raised the obvious defence in this case. He claimed that the 
search was unlawful and unreasonable. Therefore, the infringement of 
his right to be secure against unreasonable search should be remedied 
by the Court excluding the evidence of the cocaine. 
The defence subpoenaed the officer who had conducted the surreptitious 
search. He said he believed that what he did was lawful and in any 
event, he had been instructed to conduct the search by his superiors. 
He also expressed the opinion that no warrant could be issued for a 
parking lot or a car. 
The Crown, of course, relied on section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act 
which authorizes an officer to search any place, other than a dwelling 
house, if he reasonably believes that the narcotic is had or kept 
contrary to the Act. The Crown also relied on a comment made by the 
B. c. Court of Appeal* that if section 10 is read to justify only 
reasonable searches, it is not in conflict with the Charter. The 
Crown also argued (and the Court agreed) that in this case the garage 
was not part of the dwelling house. 
Defence counsel raised the old, but interesting argument that section 
lO(l)(a) N.C.A. is excessive and should be declared inoperable or 
invalid. This has been argued frequently and the Courts have held 
that the section is not as excessive as it appears to be on the 
* R. v. Collins (1983), 33 C.R. (3d) 130. 
of this publication. 
Also see page 1 Volume 12 
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surface Graunnatically, the section could be interpreted to say that 
a peace officer only needs to have "reasonable belief" to enter a 
dwelling house with a writ of assistance or a warrant, but can arbi-
trarily enter and search any other private or public place without any 
prerequisite beliefs or grounds. The Courts (with the exception of 
one Ontario District Court*) have never believed that Parliament had 
any intentions to grant such sweeping and excessive powers to peace 
officers. Reasonable belief is requisite to all searches under that 
subsection the Judges said. This Court agreed with those views and 
held that the section is operable and valid and that the reasonable-
ness of the search had to be weighed on the basis of the section. 
Defence counsel, of course, argued that even with s. lO(l)(a) in tact 
the search was unreasonable. 
The Crown had to prove the legality of the search. Then it is up to 
the accused to show on a balance of probabilities that the search was 
unreasonable and that acceptance of the evidence obtained thereby 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Just 
because a search is legal does not mean that it cannot be unreasonable 
while an illegal search is capable of being reasonable, held this 
County Court Judge. 
It was proved that the officer who conducted the surreptitious search 
had adequate reasonable grounds for believing that narcotics were 
illegally kept in the car. He gained those grounds from his super-
visor who had told him of the evidence he and other investigators had 
of cocaine being stored in the trunk of that car*. The ref ore, the 
search was lawful and the defence failed to show that the search was 
unreasonable and had infringed the accused's rights. 
The County Court Judge concluded: 
"The conduct of the search was not shocking to the commun-
ity. There was no flagrant abuse of power on the part of 
the police, nor was there a gross invasion of privacy. The 
police officer was acting in good faith and reasonably. 
Indeed, the exact opposite would be true - to exclude the 
evidence under the circumstances would be more likely to 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute". 
Evidence admitted. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Rao, not reported 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
"WHEN DOES THE CLOCK BEGIN TO TICK IN RESPECT 
TO A TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME?" 
The Queen and Carter, 
February 1984. 
B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA001508 
In April of 1980 the accused allegedly committed rape, gross indecency 
and buggery. Informations were sworn in January 1983. The Provincial 
Court Judge considered the evidence for the delay and concluded that 
the accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed 
(s. ll(b) Charter). The Crown took this decision to the Supreme 
Court* and the Provincial Court Judge, who had entered a judicial stay 
of proceedings to remedy the infringement (s. 24(1) Charter), was 
ordered to proceed with the trial. The accused appealed this order to 
the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Supreme Court Judge that the time 
period to be considered is that between the laying of the information 
and the commencement of the trial. 
The Supreme Court Judge had also said that in "exceptional cases" the 
delay before the laying of the charge may . be considered to determine 
if the delay was unreasonable. The B. C. Court of Appeal, in essence, 
erased that comment by holding that the narrow question in this case 
before the Court did not warrant the Supreme Court Justice's opinion 
on pre-information delays. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Order for Provincial Court to proceed 
upheld. 
* * * * * 
* See page 17 of Volume 15 of this publication. 
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FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT 
Mason and Basse, Brown and Smith, Ontario County Court, District of 
Waterloo Registry # 10729/81, September 1983. 
The defendants were police officers who had arrested and detained Mr. 
Mason, the plaintiff. The latter sued for damages. 
The action Mr. Mason undertook was unique in that he conceded that the 
officers had found him committing two offences under the Ontario Highway 
Traffic Act and that they also had reasonable and probable grounds for 
believing that he had committed an offence under the Criminal Code of 
Canada, namely a breach of probation. 
Usually actions of this kind are based on claims that the police did not 
have the prerequisite grounds to arrest, that no offence was committed or 
that the wrong person was arrested. In this case the plaintiff relied on 
section 450(3)(b) of the Criminal Code which, in essence states that where 
a peace officer made a legal arrest but has failed to comply with the 
statutory obligation not to arrest where he has grounds to believe that the 
public interest is satisfied, he (the officer) shall be deemed to be acting 
lawfully and in the execution of his duty. This, the subsection stipu-
lates, is the case in proceedings under the Criminal Code or any other Act 
of Parliament. However, in all other proceedings (including civil proceed-
ings) such failure will render his arrest unlawful. 
In other words, if a police officer arrests lawfully but ought not to have 
effected the arrest due to "the public interest being satisfied" then, if 
he is obstructed or assaulted, his failure to comply with section 450(2) 
c.c. would not inhibit a successful prosecution. However, the failure does 
render him liable for damages for unjustified arrest or detention. The 
same applies to the continuation of the custody of an arrested person after 
the public interest is satisfied. (See 453(3)(b) C.C.). 
In this case the plaintiff is a 7 5 year old dentist who received a lot of 
public attention when he was a party to proceedings in civil and criminal 
courts. Due to financial set backs he sold his home. The new owner 
reported to police that the plaintiff was on the property collecting items 
he claimed to be his. The attending officers noted that the plates on the 
plaintiff's car were those belonging on another vehicle owned by another 
person. They discovered also that the plaintiff was on probation arising 
from a conviction of "hit and run", a condition of which was that he was 
not to drive. 
When asked where he lived the plaintiff had answered: "I don't know". As 
this information was needed to commence proceedings against the plaintiff, 
the officers arrested him and impounded his car. Subsequent to the arrest 
it was discovered that the plaintiff had a letter from his probation 
officer giving him permission to drive. That was the officer's version. 
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The plaintiff said he produced the letter as soon as he was questioned 
about his probation. In any event, the plaintiff's detention was approxi-
mately one hour in duration. After that the police drove him home. 
All a plaintiff has to do in an action for damages for false arrest is 
prove the arrest or imprisonment and then the onus is on police to show on 
a balance of probabilities that the arrest or imprisonment was lawful. The 
sole grounds the officers advanced was the establishing of the plaintiff's 
identity so they could assure his appearance in Court. 
It was found as a fact that the plaintiff was informed of the reason for 
his arrest. Also it was determined that there was in these circumstances 
justifiable and "public interest" related reasons to arrest the plaintiff. 
Action against police officers 
dismissed. 
* * * * * 
30 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH - EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Hurst, County Court of Csriboo, Williams Lake Registry #CC124/83. 
Hurst, the accused, was seen walking on the side walk. A police officer 
timed it to come out of an alley with his police car so it would block the 
accused's path. The accused was known to the officer, however, he conceded 
not to have any reason to stop him although "it's common practice to drive 
up and speak to people in the police car at night" testified the constable. 
The officer had stepped out of his car and had asked the accused if by any 
chance he had any marihuana on him. A denial resulted in an order to empty 
all his pockets. However, after this order was complied with a bulge 
indicated that one pocket was not empty. The constable reached in and 
pulled out a plastic bag containing marihuana. The accused was charged 
accordingly. The Provincial Court Judge ruled that the search was unlawful 
and thus contrary to the Charter provision that gives us a right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure. He then found that 
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice in 
disrepute. The Crown appealed the acquittal that resulted from this 
ruling. 
In deciding that the search was unreasonable the Court considered: 
1. The constable did not have the specific assignment to enforce drug 
laws (he was not assigned to a drug squad); 
2. There was not even suspicion that the accused committed any offence; 
3. The accused appeared perfectly normal; 
4. It was conceded that if the accused had fled there would have been no 
reason to pursue him or prevent his walking away; etc. 
The aggregate of this is that there were no grounds nor justifiable reasons 
to search the accused. In the circumstances, the search and seizure were 
unreasonable and amounted to an infringement in respect to section 8 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
The second question, of course, is whether in the circumstances, the 
admission of the evidence of the possession of marihuana, would bring the 
* R. v. Collins Page 1, Volume 12 of this publication. B.C.C.A. 821475. 
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administration of justice into disrepute. Reminding this County Court of 
the decision by the B. C. Court of Appeal in the Collins case*, the Crown 
submitted that an ordinary citizen would not be shocked if a police officer 
seized illicit drugs. 
The Judge disagreed and held that the B. C. Court of Appeal did not say 
that any seizure of illicit drugs would not shock an ordinary citizen. It 
held that in the circumstances as they were in Collins, it would not be 
shocking. However, the circumstances in this case were quite different 
from those in Collins. Where here the search was arbitrary to say the 
least, in Collins the search resulted from a specific investigation. 
Though the officers had no prerequisite grounds to search Collins, they had 
grounds for suspicion. The search was perhaps unlawful and unreasonable 
but not sufficiently so as to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. In this Hurst case the circumstances were such that it would 
cause disrepute. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
* * * * * 
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HOUSE PARTY - CREATING A DISTURBANCE - OBSTRUCTING POLICE 
Regina v. Knight, County Court of Vancouver Island, Port Alberni # C.R. 
162, September 1983. 
A party was held in one side of a duplex. The magnitude and mood of the 
festivities concerned the neighbours and police were called. Everything 
went smoothly: the crowd was pleasant and co-operative and when police 
suggested that perhaps the guests should go on their way, people left the 
home in an orderly fashion. However, everybody stopped and became specta-
tors when the accused took on a hostile position by shouting very choice 
obscenities to the police officers in general and to one in particular. 
When he continued and attempts to quiet him down failed, and as the other 
guests started to gather again, the accused was arrested for creating a 
disturbance in or near a public place (the accused's abusive actions took 
place outside the home). He resisted arrest and it took two officers to 
subdue the accused. He appealed his convictions for creating a disturbance 
and resisting arrest. 
The County Court, after a review of the B. C. case law in respect to 
section 171 c.c., held that the Provincial Court Judge could not from the 
evidence before him, draw an inference from the officers' testimony that 
the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt, caused by his shouting a public 
disturbance. The accused's appeal in respect to that charge was allowed 
and an acquittal was ordered. 
The way our law was at one time (and not all that long ago) this acquittal 
would have resulted in an acquittal on the "resisting a peace officer" 
charge was well. Reiterating the law as it stands now the County Court 
Judge said: 
"It is to be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has made it 
abundantly clear the mere fact that an accused is acquitted of 
the actual charge upon which he is arrested is not a defence to a 
charge under section 118" (obstructing or resisting a peace 
officer) 
With this the Court upheld the accused's conviction of resisting arrest 
The officer had good reason for believing that the appellant was creating a 
disturbance, therefore the arrest was justified and lawful. 
Acquittal ordered for "creating a 
disturbance". 
Conviction of "resisting arrest" 
upheld. 
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Comment: The cases that best demonstrate the full cycle our Courts have 
gone on the issue this Court touched on in considering the appeal in 
respect to the conviction of resisting arrest, were decided in 1960, 1961, 
and 1975. It is not that there is a direct connection between these cases 
but they do reflect the recent historical development of our current bind-
ing precedent on this issue. 
Perhaps we ought to remind ourselves of some basics as a prelude to discus-
sing the issues involved. 
Firstly, when a peace officer exercises a statutory or common law discre-
tionary authority, he is in the lawful performance of his duty. This, of 
course, is not an exhaustive statement of when a peace officer is in such 
performance of duty. 
Secondly, when a peace officer is authorized by law, to arrest a person 
whom he finds committing an offence, he and that law are in apparent 
conflict with a basic principle of our legal system. Constitutionally the 
courts are exclusively assigned the jurisdiction to determine whether or 
not a person committed an offence. 
Thirdly, section 25(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada grants protection to 
persons who are acting under authority. That portion of this subsection, 
which is applicable to this issue, is: 
"Everyone who is authorized by !awl to do anything in the 
enforcement of the law as a peace officer is, if he acts on 
reasonable and probable grounds, justified in doing what he is 
authorized to do and2 in using as 11a1ch force as what is necessary 
for that purpose". 
l Doing something "by law" can be distinct from doing something 
"lawfully". To do something "by law" there must be a specific provision in 
the law compelling or allowing the act. When something is done "lawfully" 
it simply means that it is done not contrary to law. One can say that if 
something is done "by law" it is also done "lawfully". However, if some-
thing is done "lawfully" it does not necessarily follow that it was done 
"by law". 
2 This has been held to mean that there 11a1st be a statutory or common 
law provision for the officer to act as he did. This would not apply where 
the officer acts under a misconception of law about an offence or his 
authority. For example, if an officer would arrest a person for creating a 
disturbance in a public place, where it was apparent to him that the person 
was committing the offence, then a dismissal of that charge will not mean 
that the officer was unauthorized. But where he would arrest a person for 
creating a disturbance in a dwelling house (an offence not known to law), 
no matter how apparent or reasonable and probable the grounds may have 
been, the officer was not doing what he was authorized to do. 
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The following cases will be a good example of the making of law through 
judicial review and, at the same time, make the student aware of interest-
ing and opposing views by members of the judiciary on this legal issue 
which is of such importance to them. It will also determine what the law 
is in regards to this question. 
Regina v. Shore (1960), 129 c.c.c. 70 
A peace officer arrested a person for an of fence which he was only author-
ized to do upon finding that person committing the of fence. 
Upon a trial, the prisoner was acquitted. This, in essence, meant that 
what the officer found the prisoner doing did not amount to any offence. 
The accused had resisted the officer in effecting the arrest. The Crown 
took the position that, despite the acquittal, the officer was in the law-
ful performance of his duty. The Court convicted the accused of resisting 
the officer holding that, in spite of the fact that the officer had not 
found any offence being coDD11itted (the prerequisite to the arrest) he had 
reasonable and probable grounds that the offence was ,being coDD11itted. 
This, said the Court, justified the officer to do what he was authorized to 
do and consequently he was in the lawful performance of his duty (s. 25 
c.c.). 
Attorney General of Saskatchewan v. Pritchard (1961), 34 W.W.R. 459 
In this case, a peace officer also arrested a person for an offence which 
he was only authorized to do upon finding that person committing the 
offence. The Crown preferred, in addition to the charge of the offence for 
which the prisoner was arrested, a criminal charge for which has, as an 
essential ingredient, that the officer was in the lawful performance of his 
duty, and that the custody was lawful. 
The Court acquitted the accused of the offence the officer claimed he found 
him committing, and, reasoning quite contrary to the Judge in R. v. Shore, 
also acquitted the accused of the second charge. 
It is difficult to improve on the synopsis of the reason for judgement in 
the Martin's Criminal Code. It explains the Court's opinion as follows: 
"Where a statute confers powers to arrest without warrant a 
person found committing a criminal offence, but does not 
expressly give the right to arrest on reasonable and probable 
grounds that such a person is committing a criminal offence, the 
arrest cannot be justified if the person was, in fact, not 
committing an offence. In other words, if the person is acquit-
ted, the arrest is not lawful". 
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The Court added, in the same breath, that although the officer may not have 
been in the lawful performance of his duty in that he did not find the 
person committing the offence, he was protected under section 25 C.C. for 
liability as he had acted on reasonable and probable grounds that the 
person was committing the of fence. 
The basic distinction between these two cases is that in R. v. Shore, 
interpreting section 25(1) C.C., the Court held that acting on reasonable 
and probable grounds where the prerequisite to an arrest is finding the 
person committing the offence, legalized the arrest. In A.G. v. Pritchard, 
the Court held that section 25(1) c.c. only protects the officer if he 
acted on reasonable and probable grounds but that the subsection is 
incapable of transforming an unlawful act into a lawful one. 
The reasoning in the Pritchard case caught on quickly and was pretty well 
followed everywhere in Canada. This was also the case in British 
Columbia. In R. v. Cottam and Cottam (1970) l c.c.c. 117, a decision by 
the B. c. Court of Appeal made the Pritchard reasoning a binding precedent 
for this Province. 
Regina v. Biron (1975), 23 c.c.c. (2d) 513 
Then the Supreme Court of Canada, in this Biron case, rendered a majority 
judgement, which basically followed the reasoning in Regina v. Shore. The 
principle established in A.G. Saskatchewan v. Pritchard was superceded and 
shelved. 
The highest Court in Canada held that where a peace officer makes an arrest 
upon finding a person committing a criminal offence, the lawfulness of the 
arrest does not depend on the conviction of that person for the of fence but 
instead on the circumstances which were apparent to the officer at the 
time. 
This Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Biron case was not unanimous 
and the dissenting judgement was sharp and condemning of the precedent set 
by the majority judgement. Many in the legal profession vehemently disa-
gree with the principle created by the Biron decision and raise persuasive 
arguments that the Court totally misinterpreted a decision by the British 
House of Lords which they believed to follow. 
In England a police officer had arrested a person for an offence where he 
was only authorized to do so if he found that person committing the 
of fence. One essential ingredient of the offence was impairment by 
alcohol on the part of the offender. At the investigative stage a doctor 
disagreed with the constable's opinion regarding the impairment and there 
was no support for charging the prisoner who promptly sued the officer for 
unlawful confinement. This civil dispute finally reached the House of 
Lords which held that the officer was not civilly liable as he had acted on 
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reasonable and probable grounds and as it had been apparent to him that the 
person was committing the offence at the time of the arrest. Never did the 
House of Lords say that the arrest was lawful. 
In England there is not an enactment that contains a provision such as our 
section 25(1) C.C. and the House of Lords, to protect persons acting under 
authority, created, at common law, a provision similar to section 25(1) 
c.c. Hence the law is known as shield or protective law which must not be 
used beyond its objectives. To hold that section 25 c.c. is capable of 
rendering an unlawful act lawful for purposes as described in the synopses 
of Shore and Biron above, is considered excessive and an abuse of that 
law. The dissenting judgement in Biron considered the practice equivalent 
to using as a sword that which was provided and designed to be a shield. 
These are some of the strong opinions which oppose the views of the major-
ity of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
However, the Biron decision still stands today and is the law until either 
Parliament legislates a change or until the Court reverses its decision 
when a similar case is placed before them. The Vancouver County Court 
simply followed the "Biron Principle" when it dealt with the Knight Appeal. 
* * * * * 
